01.08.2008: IAEA Board of Governors unanimously adopts a safeguard agreement specific to India. (A) “derived material”: any radioactive material (except special fissile material) produced or radioactive by exposure to radiation during the production or use of special fissile material. By-products are not subject to security measures or any other form of verification under this agreement, unless otherwise decided by prior written agreement between the two parties. Until March 28, 2019, 23 such agreements are in effect in the United States, governing peaceful nuclear cooperation with 48 countries, the International Atomic Energy Agency and Taiwan government authorities (through the American Institute in Taiwan), as described below. India`s right to conduct nuclear tests was a cause for which Indian negotiators fought. Although India pledged to maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing in July 2005, New Delhi rejected any explicit provision in the 123 agreement to end cooperation if it conducted a nuclear test in the future. These termination clauses are standard features of U.S. agreements with non-nuclear-weapon states. Inund-USA The agreement does not contain the word “test” and it is proposed that countries maintain their cooperation in “compliance with their national laws”.
 Agreement 123 sets the conditions for bilateral civil nuclear cooperation and requires separate authorizations from the United States Congress and ministers. The agreement will also help India meet its goal of increasing nuclear capacity by 25,000 MW by 2020 through imports of nuclear reactors and fuels.  Section 123 provides that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs submits a Declaration of Nuclear Proliferation Assessment (NPAS) explaining how the nuclear cooperation agreement meets these non-proliferation conditions. Congress has a total of 90 days in an uninterrupted session to review the agreement, under which it automatically becomes law, unless Congress passes a joint resolution against it. An agreement on the 123 does not allow countries to enrich or repair nuclear materials purchased by the United States, and authorization to do so requires another negotiated agreement. A debate is underway within the non-proliferation community on the so-called “gold standard” after the 2009 agreement between the United States and the United Arab Emirates (United Arab Emirates) that the United Arab Emirates (United Arab Emirates) voluntarily renounced the pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies and capabilities. The agreement of the United Arab Emirates stands in stark contrast to the “nuet consent” to India, Japan and Euratom, which have been authorized by the United States. Norway, Austria, Brazil and Japan have all warned that their support for India with the IAEA does not mean that they will not express any reservations to the NSG. New Zealand, a member of the NSG but not of the IAEA Board of Governors, warned that it did not take its support for granted.  Ireland, which initiated the non-proliferation process in 1958 and first signed it in 1968, has questioned India`s nuclear agreement with the United States, Russia, a major potential nuclear supplier to India, has expressed reservations about the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology to India.
 China argued that the agreement was “a blow to the international non-proliferation regime”.  New Zealand stated that it wanted certain conditions to be included in the waiver: the exception when India conducts nuclear tests, India, which signs the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the limitation of the volume of technology that can be given to India and which could relate to nuclear weapons.  Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries have proposed similar changes.  The nuclear agreement was rejected by the former United States.